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What is valuable?1 How should one act? There are numerous forms of consequentialism; 
what they have in common is that they answer the second question by appealing to an 
answer to the first. Consequentialists typically claim that an act is right when it produces 
the best state of affairs (relative to other acts the agent could have performed; Hooker, 
2008), and then they offer a theory of what makes for the best state of affairs. For 
instance, classical act-utilitarianism, the most traditional form of consequentialism, holds 
that an act is right insofar as it maximizes overall utility, where utility is understood as 
the optimal balance of the most pleasure and least pain. Most consequentialists nowadays 
believe that the utilitarian focus on pleasure and pain is too simplistic, and thus provide 
alternative views of what makes for better or worse states of affairs. 
A full explanation and defense of consequentialism in all its forms is well beyond 
the scope of this chapter (though see Sinnott-Armstrong, 2011; Driver, 2012), although 
along the way I shall say some things both in clarification of and in defense of 
consequentialism in general. My main focus will be on versions of consequentialism that 
pertain directly to environmental ethics. Although consequentialism has had a grand 
history as one of the principal types of ethical theory over the last 200 years or so, 
relatively few environmental ethicists have been consequentialists (Elliot, 2001: 181). 
Why this is the case is something I will not address here (but see Hiller and Kahn, 2014); 
instead, my goals are to discuss the contours of possible consequentialist environmental 
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ethical views, compare environmental consequentialism with some competing 
environmental ethical views, and note challenges that a fleshed-out form of 
environmental consequentialism must meet. I will put special emphasis on examining a 
holistic environmental consequentialism, a view that has been, in my judgment, under-
developed. 
Two types of consequentialist accounts of our responsibilities with regard to the 
non-human world should be distinguished at the outset. First, a consequentialist may hold 
to a traditional anthropocentric view of value (see Thompson, chapter 6 of this volume) 
and argue that one must promote long-term human good, but to do so one must be 
concerned with how our actions affect the environment. Second, a consequentialist may 
adopt a theory of value according to which at least some non-human entities have 
intrinsic value. Although most forms of consequentialism explicated by philosophers who 
work primarily in environmental ethics are of this second kind, it will be instructive to 
begin by discussing a view of the first type, especially given its historical significance. 
The end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 20th marked a turning 
point in United States environmental history in that the frontier, exploited over the first 
part of the country’s history, was no longer seen as limitless. Gifford Pinchot, the first 
Head of the US Forest Service (beginning with the formation of the Forest Service under 
the Presidential administration of Theodore Roosevelt in 1905), was an avowed utilitarian 
(Pinchot, 1947; Nash, 1982; Katz, 1997), and Pinchot recognized that the greatest long-
term benefit for people required conservation of natural resources. Pinchot thus helped 
fashion regulations that restricted exploitation of the natural environment. However, 
Pinchot was not and still is not universally hailed by environmentalists. Notoriously, 
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Pinchot was instrumental in the decision to dam the Hetch Hetchy Valley in Yosemite 
National Park to provide drinking water for San Francisco. Pinchot testified before 
Congress in 1913: 
I think that the men who assert that it is better to leave a piece of natural 
scenery in its natural condition have rather the better of the argument, and 
I believe that if we had nothing else to consider than the delight of the few 
men and women who would yearly go to Hetch Hetchy Valley, then it 
should be left in its natural condition. But the considerations on the other 
side of the question, to my mind, are simply overwhelming (Walsh et al., 
2007). 
Pinchot’s reasons are entirely consequentialist and anthropocentric. On the other side of 
the debate, John Muir and the Sierra Club, which Muir founded, were adamantly opposed 
to the dam. 2 The official position of the Sierra Club was given in a principle: “That our 
National Parks shall be held forever inviolate” (Colby, 1909). Muir wrote: 
These temple destroyers, devotees of ravaging commercialism, seem to 
have a perfect contempt for Nature, and, instead of lifting their eyes to the 
God of the mountains, lift them to the Almighty Dollar. Dam Hetch 
Hetchy! As well dam for water-tanks the people's cathedrals and churches, 
for no holier temple has ever been consecrated by the heart of man 
(Walsh, et al. 2007).3  
It is critical to recognize that there are two aspects of this critique of Pinchot’s 
utilitarianism. The first is that what is held by Muir and the Sierra Club to be of value is 
more than just human good—Hetch Hetchy Valley itself has value. Second, certain acts 
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of despoiling National Parks are always impermissible, regardless of the consequences of 
the acts. Importantly, it is possible to accept the first criticism of an anthropocentric 
utilitarianism without also accepting the second. Consequentialists may develop a theory 
of value according to which there are non-human goods, and claim that damming Hetch 
Hetchy is wrong because doing so does not maximize overall value. However, 
consequentialists will still bite the bullet in claiming that nothing should be held 
inviolate. For one can imagine circumstances in which a regulatory agency is faced with 
a choice of destroying one part of a National Park in order to save numerous parts from 
being destroyed in a like manner. Would it not be better, from the perspective of one who 
values nature, to commit the violation so as to maintain as much of the park as possible?4 
This type of issue looms large in consequentialist theory. When G. E. M. 
Anscombe (1958) introduced the term “consequentialism,” she intended it as a 
derogatory term. First, Anscombe argues that consequentialist views are wrong in that 
they to fail to distinguish between foreseeable consequences of an action from intended 
consequences. For Anscombe, it is appropriate to perform an act when the intended 
consequences are good even if the overall foreseeable consequences are not. In addition, 
Anscombe decries any view according to which certain acts that cause harm to innocent 
persons are morally right. Arguably, Anscombe is wrong on both counts (see Bennett, 
1966 for an early response to Anscombe). If one intends to make a friend happy by 
buying him a statue made of ivory, it seems like a morally wrong act if one foresees that 
the purchase will lead to endangered elephants being killed. And one can imagine highly 
unfortunate scenarios in which harming an innocent person will end up saving numerous 
innocent persons from being harmed. Why do we intuitively hold that harming an 
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innocent person is wrong? The reason, it seems, is that the outcome of doing so is that an 
innocent person will be harmed. But if one is so concerned about preventing innocent 
persons from being harmed, then it is seemingly irrational to approve of activities that 
lead to more such harm when one could act to minimize it. In short, whatever one takes 
to be of value—human life, human integrity, animal well-being, wilderness areas—it 
would be wrong to act in such a way that, ceteris paribus, more of what is of value is 
destroyed. 
As I have noted, most consequentialist environmental ethicists accept that there 
are non-human goods, and in what follows I shall focus on the varieties of such non-
anthropocentric views. A good place to begin is to note that Jeremy Bentham, founder of 
utilitarianism, argues that the welfare of nonhuman animals may be considered in moral 
calculus (Bentham [1789] 1996). This utilitarian view is elaborated upon in great detail 
by Peter Singer in his book Animal Liberation (1975) and elsewhere. Singer’s view is 
sentientism—all and only sentient beings’ experiences have value (see Gruen, Chapter 7 
of this volume). Singer does argue that we should preserve natural areas and non-sentient 
things, but only on instrumental grounds; ecological habitats, and the non-sentient 
organisms in them, are necessary to support sentient animals in leading satisfying lives 
but are not valuable in themselves. 
Arguably, Singer’s sentientist consequentialist position in favor of animal welfare 
is more plausible than the main alternative—the rights-based approach of Tom Regan 
(1983). In Regan’s view, animals with certain psychological attributes have rights, and 
this entails, for instance, that one should never conduct medical testing on animals even if 
it promotes the greater good. However, it seems reasonable, in some cases at least, that if 
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the benefit of conducting testing on animals will be significant relative to the harm 
caused to a few animals, then it is permissible. A sentientist consequentialist approach, 
which tallies the good against the bad, will have this result. 
One may object to sentientist consequentialism on the ground that it fails to 
properly respect the intrinsic values of non-sentient living things (see Palmer, Chapter 8 
of this volume). Robin Attfield, in a series of works (Attfield, 1983, 1999, 2003, 2014), 
defends biocentric individualism, the idea that all and only living things have value. 
Although others such as Albert Schweitzer ([1923] 2008) and Paul Taylor (1986) defend 
the value of all living things, Attfield is unique in doing so from a consequentialist 
perspective. Like Schweitzer and Taylor, Attfield appeals to the fact that living things 
have interests and capacities in pursuing their own good, and this qualifies them as 
having value (Attfield, 1999: 39). However, unlike Schweitzer and Taylor, Attfield is an 
inegalitarian—he believes that although all and only living things are valuable, not all 
living things are equal in value. Some organisms have higher capacities, such as for 
autonomous action, and such creatures have greater value than organisms with more 
limited capacities. This helps biocentric individualism avoid the implausible consequence 
that a blade of grass is equally morally considerable to a chimpanzee or human. 
Still, some philosophers, and certainly many environmentalists who are not 
professional philosophers, find even biocentrism to be too limited. Sentientist and 
biocentric consequentialism are in principle consistent with massive alteration of native 
ecosystems and even the extinction of many species for the purpose of maximizing 
positive sentient experience or maximizing the good of living things, respectively. (Some 
utilitarians, such as Brian Tomasik, 2014, embrace this ramification.) Instead, what 
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matters, according to many, is the flourishing of ecosystems (see Callicott, Chapter 9 of 
this volume). However, unlike sentientist consequentialism, with its lengthy defense by 
Singer, and unlike biocentric consequentialism, with its well-developed account given by 
Attfield, there has not been an extensive and detailed explication or sustained defense of 
a fully consequentialist position that accepts ecosystemic values. I shall thus dedicate 
much of the remainder of this chapter to this kind of consequentialism, although the 
remarks I make will of necessity be a mere sketch of a position. 
Famously, Aldo Leopold’s “Land Ethic” is ecocentric, and it is phrased in what 
appears to be consequentialist terms ([1949] 1980, 262): “A thing is right when it tends to 
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it 
tends otherwise.”  However, James Fieser argues (1992)—successfully in my opinion—
that Leopold did not intend the land ethic as a primary moral principle, let alone an act-
consequentialist one. As Fieser claims, Leopold either was ignorant of utilitarianism or 
chose not to deeply engage with it (also see Moline, 1986). Of course, Leopold’s views 
have been adopted by philosophers who are indeed well aware of normative theory. J. 
Baird Callicott, for instance, accepts Leopold’s Land Ethic and in his early work seems to 
accept some of its consequentialist implications (Callicott, 1989). 
However, the charge of so-called “environmental fascism,” as levied by Tom 
Regan (1983: 361), led Callicott to abandon consequentialism (Callicott, 1999: 172–173). 
Regan argues that accepting Leopold’s Land Ethic as the single moral principle would 
absurdly entail that it is more morally appropriate to kill a human being rather than an 
endangered wildflower. Similar to what we saw in the case of the Sierra Club’s criticism 
of Pinchot, the environmental fascism objection raises two distinct issues. As Clare 
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Palmer notes (1998: 136), there is, first, the standard objection to consequentialism that it 
does not protect inviolable individual human rights, and second, there is an objection 
against the view that a wildflower, in its ecosystem, may contribute more to overall value 
than a human. I shall say more about environmental fascism below; for now I simply note 
that Callicott responds by disavowing his earlier acceptance of the Land Ethic as the 
single principle for right action.5 
However, it is not hard to imagine an act-consequentialist view that upholds the 
spirit of Leopold’s view and that can withstand the objection from environmental 
fascism. Elsewhere, I argue in favor of what I call system consequentialism (Hiller, 
2014). Like other forms of maximizing act-consequentialism, it is the view that one 
should act so as to produce the best state of affairs. But it adds an important proviso: To 
determine what is the best state of affairs, one should not simply aggregate the goods that 
are possessed by individuals. Instead, the best state of affairs is the one that has the most 
systemic good. In what follows, I shall briefly explain the notion of systemic good and 
how it may fit within a consequentialist ethic, and I argue that a refined version of it does 
not succumb to the problem of environmental fascism. 
A system may be defined as a whole with interdependent parts (Leopold, [1949] 
1980: 262; Callicott, 1999: 130–131). There are many details that must be given in a full 
metaphysical account of interdependence, and I shall not attempt to give such an account 
here (though see Hiller, 2013). Still, ecosystems can be considered to be paradigm cases 
of systems. Organisms within an ecosystem have evolved with other organisms in the 
ecosystem, and thus members of the various species form an interdependent web. What 
makes an ecosystem valuable? Leopold’s original characterization of ecosystemic 
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goodness invokes a notion of stability, but most ecologically minded philosophers 
nowadays reject stability as an ecosystemic value. Because of this, it is difficult to arrive 
at an uncontroversial notion of ecosystemic value. Still, by defining ecosystemic health in 
a dynamic way, a number of philosophers still do attribute value to ecosystems (see 
especially McShane, 2004; also see Callicott, 1999 and Chapter 9 of this volume; 
Rolston, 1988, and 1991; Jamieson, 2002). 
One feature of system consequentialism is that it may help explain, in 
consequentialist terms, what is (prima facie) wrong about cases where humans disrupt 
ecosystems. On a common view, disrupting an ecosystem is, in itself, a bad thing. For 
instance, Robert Elliot (1997) holds that when humans interfere in a natural system, the 
resultant area will have less value than an otherwise identical ecosystem that has not been 
disrupted by human action. But this type of anti-interference judgment seems at odds 
with consequentialism: typical consequentialists hold that what matters in the evaluation 
of an action is only the outcome of the action, and if two actions lead to states of affairs 
that are otherwise identical, then the actions should be judged equally. But if an impacted 
ecosystem is not as valuable as an otherwise identical one that humans have chosen not to 
disturb, it is hard to see how a consequentialist can account for the difference. Elliot, who 
himself otherwise is a supporter of a consequentialist environmental ethic, abandons 
consequentialism at this crucial juncture (Elliot, 1997: 113–114). 
Despite initial appearances, this is not an intractable problem for the ecologically 
minded consequentialist. When a human acts, the act may be more or less in accord with 
systemic, ecological good, for some human actions are contrary to natural systems and 
others are not. On the assumption that we are able to make prior value judgments about 
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the good of systems, in cases where a human action disrupts a natural system we can say 
that there is something about the very action itself that makes the state of affairs less 
valuable. This view also allows that human actions can contribute positively to overall 
value if they are done in accord with natural systems, in the same way that the action of 
any organism is good when it is done in accord with its natural ecosystem. But to be 
clear, this is merely to say that some human acts can be assessed as contributing to 
systemic good or bad, which is not the same as saying that such acts are, on their own, 
right or wrong.6 Thus an impacted ecosystem has less value than an otherwise identical, 
undisturbed one simply because systemic good is greater when a system that has 
historically not been inhabited by humans remains free from human interference. 
However, there remains the problem of environmental fascism. If we value 
ecosystems, and if preserving a single endangered wildflower maintains ecosystemic 
good more than saving a human, then it seems that we should value the flower more than 
the human. Yet ecosystems do not seem to be harmed when humans steal or commit 
murder (Fieser, 1992), but surely we should have an ethic that prohibits such actions in at 
least most situations. 
As I just noted, there are two aspects to the charge of environmental fascism. I 
shall set aside further discussion of the issue of whether it is ever right to cause harm to 
one individual for the sake of the greater good, since that is a more general concern for 
consequentialists. Instead, I shall focus on the charge that system consequentialism may 
absurdly place more value on flowers than on humans (or other sentient organisms). The 
system consequentialist may first note that indeed a long-term reduction of the human 
population may be best, but this in itself would not justify murder, since there are much 
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better ways of lowering population (such as providing increased education for women). 
Second, one may accept multidimensional consequentialism, a view developed by Alan 
Carter (2005).7 In Carter’s view, there is a plurality of values—anthropocentric, 
zoocentric, biocentric, and ecocentric. According to Carter, there is no inconsistency in 
claiming that ecosystems are valuable but humans are as well, and human good can in 
some cases outweigh ecosystemic good. Carter specifically uses this to respond to the 
problem of environmental fascism (Carter, 2011b). For Carter, there is a plurality of 
goods that must be weighed against each other in determining right action. 
However, there is a potential problem with Carter’s view. According to Carter, 
the different kinds of value are independent of each other. But this seems mistaken, for 
arguably, ecocentric values are not independent of biocentric, zoocentric, or even 
anthropocentric values, given that ecosystems simply are composed of non-sentient living 
things, sentient animals, and in some cases humans (in addition to non-living things; see 
Attfield, 2014 for a similar concern). But this consideration allows for another form of 
response to the problem of environmental fascism. Although for the system 
consequentialist, the ultimate value is the value of systems, the value of a system may be 
taken to depend, in part, on what individuals are in the system. Ecosystems with more 
complex and sentient animals may be taken to be more valuable systems than 
functionally similar ones that have only non-sentient individuals. Thus if one were to 
choose to save a wildflower over a human or other sentient animal, the total value of the 
ecosystem would decrease even if its ecosystemic health increases. How far this 
modification of eco-consequentialism moves away from an original Leopoldian 
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ecocentric vision and toward a more anthropocentric or sentientist one is a matter for 
investigation beyond the scope of this chapter.8 
Having discussed various forms of environmental consequentialism, it may be 
instructive to compare environmental consequentialism with alternative forms of 
environmental ethical theory—deontology (see Hale, Chapter 17 of this volume), virtue 
theory (see Sandler, Chapter 18 of this volume), and pragmatism (see Minteer, Chapter 
43 of this volume). Although there are stark differences between the views, there is also, 
perhaps surprisingly, quite a bit of common ground. I have already argued briefly that 
there are reasons to believe that there should be no inviolable deontological restrictions, 
and that what motivates deontological restrictions  ought to be framed in consequentialist 
terms . However, maintaining that certain actions have negative axiological valence when 
they disturb ecosystems is a step toward deontology, and as I argue elsewhere, the system 
consequentialist can accept a wide range of intuitive judgments that typically are upheld 
by deontological views (see Hiller, 2014). Still, even though it holds that some acts have 
axiological valence, system consequentialism remains a consequentialist view in that it 
holds that whether an act is right can be determined only be appealing to the full range of 
states of affairs that ensue if one performs the act. 
Both environmental virtue ethicists (see e.g., Hill Jr., 1983) and environmental 
pragmatists (see e.g., Norton, 2005) criticize the core notion for any consequentialist 
theory, the notion of intrinsic value. I will address the issue of intrinsic value 
momentarily, but I will briefly note at the outset that numerous defenses of claims of 
intrinsic value, which can be employed by consequentialists, have been made by 
philosophers writing on environmental ethics on both meta-ethically objectivist (Rolston, 
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1988) and subjectivist (Callicott, 1999; Jamieson, 2008; McShane, 2007; McShane, 
2011) grounds. 
There is perhaps more in common between consequentialism and both 
environmental virtue ethics and environmental pragmatism than one might initially think. 
Although Robert Elliot argues on consequentialist grounds that a version of 
environmental virtue ethics problematically requires some prior notion of what is good in 
nature (Elliot, 1997: 55–58), there are other forms of environmental virtue ethics that are 
not susceptible to Elliot’s argument. For instance, Ronald Sandler’s Character and 
Environment (Sandler, 2007)—perhaps the most complete work dedicated to explicating 
and defending environmental virtue ethics—is in fact quite similar to a consequentialist 
view, for according to Sandler’s view, what makes a character trait a virtue is that it is 
conducive to goodness (Sandler, 2007). As Sandler himself notes (Sandler, 2007: 32), his 
environmental virtue ethic is quite similar to rule-consequentialism. (However, see 
Thompson, 2008 for a criticism of Sandler from within environmental virtue ethics.) 
Furthermore, all consequentialists would encourage the development of virtuous 
character traits in promoting overall value. 
The commonality between environmental pragmatism and environmental 
consequentialism may be first seen by noting how both views are outcome-oriented; 
consequentialist views simply formalize talk of good outcomes in a way that is grounded 
in axiological principles. In fact, some arguments used by environmental pragmatists 
straightforwardly support environmental consequentialism. For instance, consider Ben 
Minteer’s analysis of Holmes Rolston’s view regarding Nepalese tigers. Minteer writes: 
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Because I subscribe to a contextual and experimental approach toward 
intrinsic value, I cannot follow Rolston and simply decide to ‘put the 
tigers first’ in Nepal… [For Rolston,] our obligations become immediately 
obvious—we must protect the park’s biological integrity at any cost, 
including, perhaps, the lives of the distressed citizens at its borders. 
(Minteer, 2012: 70) 
Minteer rejects this “at any cost” ethic. Setting aside whether this is the proper 
interpretation of Rolston’s view, there is much here with which the environmental 
consequentialist will be sympathetic. Consequentialists will welcome the idea that 
judgments about how to act must be based upon the specific decision-making context and 
on empirical information about long-term consequences. And of course Minteer’s 
rejection of the idea that one must save an animal species regardless of the consequences 
of doing so is the same kind of argument that consequentialists have long been leveling 
against deontologists, which I discussed previously. 
In the end, environmental consequentialists and environmental pragmatists will 
part company about the nature of intrinsic value. Minteer’s notion of the contextual 
nature of judgments of value is not the same as the consequentialist’s. Minteer writes: 
“[N]oninstrumental claims [of value] are not epistemically or metaphysically 
foundational. They are contextual and are justified in terms of their ability to contribute 
to the resolution of specific environmental problems” (Minteer, 2012: 67). However, a 
consequentialist defender of intrinsic value would claim that by placing judgments of 
intrinsic value secondary to a logically prior notion of the “resolution” of environmental 
problems, environmental pragmatists put the cart before the horse. For what counts as a 
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successful resolution? Certainly many environmental problems have been “resolved” by 
humans simply choosing to destroy the part of nature in question. But it seems that many 
such ways in which people have resolved problems are bad resolutions due to their 
negative impact on the natural world. But the pragmatist, who places judgments of 
intrinsic goodness and badness posterior to judgments about resolutions of problems, is in 
no position to make such a judgment. This issue is of course complex and deserves more 
attention than can be given here. 
There is also a more general worry about intrinsic value that environmental 
pragmatists have expressed. They claim that a focus on the intrinsic value of the non-
human world may be ineffective or even counterproductive in promoting environmental 
policy (see e.g., Light, 2005). However, a consequentialist environmental ethic is 
immune to this concern. First, consequentialists also want their theoretical views to be 
put into practice to have the best overall effects; but this may simply lead one to the view 
that what consequentialists say in academic texts should differ from what they say 
publicly when making policy arguments (see de Lazari-Radek and Singer, 2010). Second, 
the evidence is in fact quite strong that appeals to intrinsic value have had positive 
influence on people. For instance, Kempton et al. (1996) show that most people, even 
mill workers who lost their jobs due to use restrictions from the effort to preserve habitat 
for the spotted owl in the US Northwest, value the non-human world intrinsically.9 
I have attempted to show that a form of consequentialism that accepts 
ecosystemic value but gives more value to humans and complex sentient animals is a 
promising view. Still, there are challenges that a fully fledged consequentialist 
environmental ethic faces. As I noted earlier, the system consequentialist needs to 
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provide a theory of what a system is, what exactly makes systems good, and to what 
degree different systems are good. In fact, there has never been a consensus among 
consequentialists about the relative weights of any sets of values; ever since John Stuart 
Mill’s criticism of simplistic hedonic utilitarianism (Mill, [1863] 1998) it has been a 
matter of controversy exactly how to measure good states of affairs. System 
consequentialism, which counts the complexity and sentience of the individual beings in 
an ecosystem as a source of increased value for the system, exponentially increases this 
difficulty. There is thus reason to believe that system consequentialists will never be able 
to provide a theory of the good that can help with real-world decision making. 
I shall note two points in response to this worry. First, this is not on its own a fatal 
objection against system consequentialism or consequentialism more broadly. For a 
consequentialist may claim that it only demonstrates that in many cases, it is extremely 
difficult to determine what the right action or policy is. Uncertainty about what exactly is 
of value is not a sufficient reason to hold that we should abandon the project of giving a 
theory of what is valuable, for that would simply take us even farther away from knowing 
which actions are right. Second, some consequentialists have attempted to show that there 
are still rational ways to act even when there is uncertainty about the relative values 
between different kinds of goods—namely, by attributing weights to different views of 
value in a consequentialist calculus (Bykvist, 2014). If this view succeeds, uncertainty 
about levels of value should not lead us to reject consequentialism. 
There are also concerns that due to the long-term and multidimensional nature of 
environmental problems, consequentialism will never be able to provide a decision 
procedure for actions or policies.10 However, a response similar to the previous one may 
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be given. First, such a view simply shows that decisions regarding the environment are 
extremely difficult ones, and not that consequentialism is wrong. Second, we should still 
do our best to maximize expected utility, even if there is a great deal of uncertainty; to do 
anything else would be to act in a worse way. 
Although there are still significant challenges for the development of 
consequentialist environmental ethics, it is in many respects a new field of inquiry, and 
there is hope that with further development it can be fleshed out more completely. My 
own view is that the fact that these outstanding questions exist should lead philosophers 
to work to resolve them on behalf of maximizing act-consequentialism rather than 
abandon it for its alternatives. For by abandoning maximizing consequentialism one will, 
by definition, fail to always endorse doing what has the most long-term good, whatever 
one takes to be good—be it human experiences, experiences of all sentient beings, 
ecosystems, or something else. Why should one ever prefer doing something other than 
what will lead to what is best? 
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organic unities. On the one hand, Moore does not believe that the value of a unity 
is equal to the sum of the components. However, this still leaves open the 
possibility that the value of the whole is at least correlated with the values of the 
individuals in the whole. See Moore (1959/1903, ch. 1). 
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24 
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Gardiner (2011, §7.5) for a critique of utilitarian approaches that also applies to 
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